


























                                                
1 I take it that am here assuming that the notions of explanation, understanding, and of gaining insight are closely related: to gain insight into a phenomenon is to increase one’s understanding of the phenomenon and explanations provide understanding or insight. 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phenomenological.  In particular, details of the micro‐theory are not needed to account for the relativistic behavior of stable macroscopic objects, which is explained solely by appealing to the principle of Lorentz invariance. Brown himself, in fact, seems to have recognized the limited value of Einstein’s distinction and struggles in his book to locate his answer to the question “what is special relativity?” within Einstein’s framework, despite his initial commitment to a constructive account.  Brown’s ultimate view, it seems to me is exactly the view I sketched here:  the content of special relativity is given by the ‘big principle’ of Lorentz invariance (see Brown 2005, 146‐7).  But his problem then is how to think of this principle, which neither has the character of a purely phenomenological principle nor does it itself provide a detailed constructive model.  Thus Brown concludes that “at its most fundamental, SR is a theory that lies somewhere in between a pure principle theory (like thermodynamics, or Einstein’s 1905 version of SR) and a fully constructive theory (like statistical mechanics).” (Brown 2005, 147)  In light of his initial insistence on the superiority of constructive accounts and his earlier discussion of explanation, this verdict is rather surprising, especially since it commits him to the claim that at its most fundamental relativity lies somewhere in between an explanatory theory and one that simply fails to explain! Finally, thinking of relativity theory as a general principle theory, allows us to make sense of the two quotes from Pauli above.  Since the theory is not a phenomenological theory, it does not take rods and clocks as fundamental and can recognize that the contraction of a rod is a very complicated process.  But by the same token, the theory is not constructive and its value consists precisely in the fact that shows that paradigmatically relativistic effects are derivable without making any specific assumptions about the structure of matter. Where does this leave the debate between Brown and Janssen?  In taking Brown to argue that properly interpreted relativistic explanations of time dilation and length contraction need to invoke the details of the micro‐dynamics, Janssen appear to have been misled by Brown’s attempt to fit his interpretation into Einstein’s principle‐constructive framework.  In fact both agree that the ‘big principle’ of Lorentz invariance is all that is needed in order to account for these phenomena.  According to Brown special relativity provides, in the principle of Lorentz invariance, a universal constraint on the nature of the 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non‐gravitational interactions (Brown 2005, 147).  According to Janssen, relativity Lorentz invariance as a constraint that “transcends the individual laws.” (Janssen 2009, 28)  Janssen calls a universal constraint that is independent of the details of a theory’s dynamics “kinematical”, while Brown calls the constraint “dynamical”—but this seems to be a disagreement about terminology rather than about substance. Thus, Brown and Janssen agree on the overarching lesson we can draw from Janssen’s case studies—namely that the general constraint of Lorentz‐invariance is a common source of all instances  of relativistic behavior.  Yet Janssen wants to go beyond that and maintains that the structure of Minkowski spacetime provides a common origin explanation of universal Lorentz invariance.  (For Brown, by contrast, the appropriate geometric structure in which to represent the motion of physical objects is Minkowski space‐time, precisely because the dynamical laws are Lorentz‐invariance.)  Yet I share Brown’s puzzlement about this aspect of Janssen’s view (see, e.g., Brown and Pooley 2006, 81), since Janssen explicitly agrees with Brown that the role of Minkowski spacetime is to “encode”  the Lorentz invariance of the laws.  It is difficult to see how Minkowski spacetime can merely serve to encode the Lorentz‐invariance of the laws and yet at the same time also provide an explanation of Lorentz‐invariance.  Indeed, it would seem that whatever information or claim is encoded is explanatorily prior to the structure in which it is encoded. Perhaps, however, Janssen’s insistence that Lorentz‐invariance is to be explained by something beyond that principle points to what be perhaps the most interesting potential disagreement between his and Brown’s views, even though neither stresses this point explicitly, and this is a disagreement concerning the modal status of Lorentz invariance.  According to Brown and Pooley, “the Lorentz covariance of all the fundamental laws of physics is an unexplained brute fact.”  But, they continue: “This, in and of itself, does not count against the interpretations: all explanation must stop somewhere.”  (Brown and Pooley 2006, 80)  Janssen, however, criticizes Brown’s proposal precisely for this feature and argues that the Lorentz‐invariance of all of our laws ought not to come out as a “cosmic coincidence” (Janssen 2009, 48).  Lorentz‐invariance, on Janssen’s account, characterizes the “generic” or “default” behavior of physical systems and he stresses that he wants to endorse what he takes to be the normative connotations of this characterization. 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Now, taken at face value what Brown and Janssen say is puzzling.  For if Lorentz‐invariance is indeed a law—that is—is nomologically necessary, how can it also be a ‘brute fact’ or a ‘coincidence’?  One way to make sense of Janssen’s worry is to introduce the notion of a meta‐law or meta‐constraint, which bears the same relation to the laws as the laws bear to particular matters of fact.  Lorentz‐invariance, then, might be thought of as such a ‘super law’ in Eugene Wigner’s sense, which “provides a structure or coherence to the laws of nature just as the laws provide a structure and coherence to the set of events.”  (Symmetry and Conversation Laws 1964, p. 16‐7)  We may have finally reached a point of genuine disagreement:  Is universal Lorentz‐invariance a meta‐law that can explain why all particular dynamical laws are Lorentz‐invariant, or is Lorentz‐invariance merely a property of all physical laws that that cannot be further explained and has no higher ‘grade’ of necessity than that of nomological necessity?  I think what one’s answer to this question is will depend strongly on one’s views on the metaphysics of modality.  I take it that someone who believes in nomological necessity and in grades of nomological necessity as fundamental ingredients in the inventory of the world, would find an appeal to Lorentz‐invariance as meta‐nomological constraint explanatory.  It is less clear to me how someone with strong Humean intuitions would view the situation.  To be sure, a Humean might be able to mimic all the appeals to the explanatory force of laws, by invoking a version of the Mill‐Ramsey‐Lewis view of laws.  But since MRL laws, and by extension any putative meta‐law, are merely summaries of the mosaic of particular matters of fact, it is not clear how one might recover the distinction between different grades of necessity.  In fact, it is unclear whether any putative meta‐law such as the principle of Lorentz‐invariance could even be an axiom of the best system, given that, by hypothesis, it is implied by all the dynamical laws.  If a system includes all dynamical laws, adding Lorentz‐invariance leads to a less simple system without gain in deductive strength.  A system without the dynamical laws and only Lorentz‐invariance is much simpler but is much less strong than a system including the dynamics. Unfortunately Brown’s and Janssen’s remarks are ambiguous on this issue.  On the one hand, Brown calls Lorentz‐invariance a brute fact, but on the other hand he calls it a “super law.”  And Janssen searches for an account of Lorentz‐invariance that has normative force, but finds the notion of nomic necessity “questionable.” (Janssen 2009, 28 fn. 7) 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Perhaps here, too, there is ultimately less of a disagreement than it may seem and both would like to endorse a broadly Humean conception.  But if we adopt a Humean best system account of laws together with spacetime relationalism, then it becomes even more difficult to see how, as Janssen maintains, the geometry of Minkowski spacetime could be explanatorily prior to the Lorentz invariance of the laws.  Both the choice of geometrical structure in which to represent the motion of physical objects and the choice of dynamical laws, on this view, is determined by which choice yields the overall best system.  The choice of metric, thus, is not prior to the determination of the laws but rather in conjunction with the laws.  If the simplest laws are Lorentz‐invariant, then the simplest choice of metric is the Minkowski metric.  Or, as Brown and Pooley put it: “the appropriate structure is Minkowski geometry precisely because the laws of physics, including those to be appealed to in the dynamical explanation of length contraction, are Lorentz covariant.” (2006, 77) 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